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OVERLOOKED VICTORIES:
TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING NON-CAPITAL OUTCOMES
BY: LESLEY MEREDITH JAMES
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATING
Plea bargaining plays an important role in capital cases and has
unique problems associated with it. There are endless ways to plea bar-
gain a case, limited only by the attorney's own innovation and creativity.
Plea bargaining is a vital part of the defense attorney's role in trying a
capital case as it is one of the few options available that guarantees the
client will not be executed. It is also an alternative that is often over-
looked as the defense attorney is faced with the overwhelming enormity
of preparing for a capital trial.
In order to take advantage of this often life-saving opportunity, it is
important to begin negotiating with the Commonwealth for a non-capital
disposition immediately upon accepting a capital case or at least after
thorough investigation sufficient to satisfy counsel that the
Commonwealth can prove defendant guilty of some crime. In some
cases, it may be beneficial to begin negotiating a non-capital disposition
before the media brings the defendant into the spotlight.
The negotiation process should not end until the defendant has been
found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. Initially, the
Commonwealth may resist, but circumstances change throughout the
course of a trial. The possibility always remains that as the trial process
unfolds the Commonwealth's perception of the strength of the case, the
defendant, the costs involved and the amount of work and time required
to continue seeking death may drastically alter the prosecutor's reluc-
tance to reach a non-capital disposition through negotiation.
The majority of both civil and criminal cases are settled. The rea-
son this occurs is that rarely is it beneficial to only one side to reach a
negotiated settlement. It is important for defense counsel to embrace this
reality and act on it.
In those cases where the evidence of guilt is strong and a death sen-
tence is a likely possibility, defense counsel, at a minimum, must always
explore the possibility of negotiating a non-capital disposition. This is
true, although, as will be discussed in a later section of this article, there
are times when a plea agreement will not be in the best interests of the
client. However, the most effective way to prevent the client from receiv-
ing a death sentence is to remove the option of a death sentence from pos-
sible outcomes.
The benefits of negotiating a non-capital disposition may also
extend to the family members of the victim. A plea agreement permits
closure for the victim's family, prevents the reopening of old wounds
every six to eight months as the case progresses from the pre-trial stage
through years of appellate review and still affords penalties that are ade-
quate to do justice.
This article is intended to serve as a guide to negotiating a non-cap-
ital disposition. It provides a general strategy for capital negotiations and
a method for specifically implementing the strategy based on a method
developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury in the book Getting to Yes:
Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In.1 In addition, the article
will set forth the legal framework in Virginia for negotiating a capital
plea agreement and suggests particular circumstances in which agreeing
to a plea arrangement may not be in the best interest of the client. The
article also discusses the legal caveats involved in reaching a successful
non-capital disposition.
Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an
Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin Books 1981).
II. GENERAL STRATEGY
There is no single approach for negotiating a non-capital disposition
of a death penalty case. However, one method that has proven success-
ful in Virginia, and in other states that employ the death penalty, is a
simultaneous implementation of the following two strategies.
A. The Hard Sell
The primary technique used in effectuating the "hard sell" is one of
imposing costs upon the Commonwealth for seeking the death penalty.
Counsel should make a case to the prosecutor that a capital sentence is
not worth pursuing. Defense counsel should demonstrate to the
Commonwealth the potential expense involved in trying a capital case
and should make clear that he will employ any means permitted by law
to ensure a verdict of life, regardless of the expense to the
Commonwealth.
After an initial offer to discuss a non-capital disposition has been
rebuffed, it is both responsible lawyering and productive of further nego-
tiation to begin imposing these costs without further delay. This should
be considered good lawyering because even if defense counsel believes a
negotiated outcome is possible, the state is still officially trying to kill the
client. The imposition of these costs provides a solid basis for negotia-
tion, as the increased costs, required only by the capital nature of the case,
create currency for negotiation. These are increased costs not only
because of direct trial costs, but also because potential appellate issues
are created that may defeat the death penalty altogether or magnify the
costs ten-fold in the future.
While there is no need at this point to engage in ongoing discussion,
counsel can make sure that the prosecutor and the trial judge are aware
that the costs being imposed are solely the responsibility of the prosecu-
tor, as they end as soon as the death sentence is no longer sought.
Specifically, counsel should note the costs of voir dire, investigators,
and experts and that these costs will be twice the amount involved in a
non-capital trial, as they will be incurred at both the guilt/innocence trial
and at the penalty trial.
Pretrial practice affords defense counsel opportunities to impose
costs on the Commonwealth. This can be accomplished through the use
of the Bill of Particulars to create issues, spawn further motions, and
require evidentiary hearings; through the use of Virginia's "3:1" mental
health expert statute 2; and through the procurement of resources mandat-
ed by Ake v. Oklahoma.
3
The first device that can be used to impose costs on the
Commonwealth is the Bill of Particulars. The cost, in terms of both time
and money, to the Commonwealth that can be created through pre-trial
motions and evidentiary hearings, based on the Bill of Particulars alone,
is considerable. For example, a Bill of Particulars requesting the
Commonwealth to identify the aggravating factors it intends to rely upon
in support of a death sentence can be a starting point for imposing costs,
If the Commonwealth refuses to specify the factor(s) to be used, defense
counsel can continue to impose costs by producing a motion to prohibil
2 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (1990) [hearinafter "3:1"].
3 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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he imposition of the death penalty based on Gardner v. Florida.4 The
.3ill of Particulars also asks that if vileness is one of the factors to be
: elied upon, a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction be given
io permit meaningful distinction among murders and so that a defense to
t can be prepared. If this request is denied, defense counsel can further
mpose costs through a motion to prohibit the imposition of the death
enalty based on Godfrey v. Georgia
5 and Lankford v. Idaho.6
If a narrowing construction is provided it will most likely be that
vhich is set out in Smith v. Commonwealth.7 If a narrowing construction
s, in fact, given, counsel can continue cost imposition by filing a motion
1 o prohibit the imposition of the death penalty based on the inadequacy of
1he Commonwealth's narrowing construction based on Shell v.
dlississippi.8
In addition, counsel may find in some cases that a motion to prohib-
t the imposition of the death penalty is proper on the basis that the evi-
lence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the vileness aggravat-
i ng factor. For example, if the facts of the case reveal that the victim was
I illed by a single shot, this may not be sufficient to establish the aggra-
iating factor as a matter of law.
If the Commonwealth responds that it will rely on future dangerous-
i less, counsel should supplement the Bill of Particulars under the unadju-
i licated act statute9 to request notice of the unadjudicated acts the
ICommonwealth intends to rely on to establish future dangerousness.
Once the unadjudicated acts have been disclosed, defense counsel
i:an begin to impose costs by filing a blanket pre-trial motion to exclude
All evidence of unadjudicated misconduct in the present case. This
motion will most likely be denied. A motion can then be generated to
i'equire the jury, before considering unadjudicated misconduct, to find by
;ome standard of proof that each of the acts were actually committed by
i he defendant. Motions in limine contending that the disclosed acts have
no relevance to future dangerousness can also be filed to continue the
imposition of costs on the Commonwealth.
The creation of "mini-trials" through issuing subpoenas, making
additional requests for investigators, producing motions and requesting
o-videntiary hearings on whether or not the defendant actually committed
I he unadjudicated acts disclosed by the Commonwealth lead to even fur-
I her imposition of costs.
Further, the Commonwealth must comply with a court's order to
reveal the grounds upon which it seeks to rely for proof of future danger-
ousness within a reasonable amount of time before trial. If the prosecu-
Iion fails to provide such notice within a reasonable time before trial,
4 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that a defendant must have opportu-
nity to rebut the State's case for death).
5 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding death sentence invalid due to the
failure of the state court to provide a constitutional limiting construction
to the aggravating circumstance providing for the death penalty for a mur-
der "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim." "There is no way to distinguish this case, in which the death penal-
y was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.").
6 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991) (ruling that death sentence, imposed by
judge after state gave written notice that it did not intend to seek death
penalty and presented no evidence in support thereof, is unconstitutional;
risk that the adversary system malfunctioned where defense not ready to
contest case).
7 239 Va. 243, 389 S.E.2d 871 (1990).
8 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that definition of "heinous, atrocious or
cruel" is inadequate; concurrence on disjunctive quality of instruction,
where one of three elements is inadequate, the aggravating circumstance
is invalid). See case summary of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 2, p. 3 (1991). See also case summary of Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956
(4th Cir. 1994), Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
counsel can impose additional costs on the Commonwealth by generating
a motion to exclude the introduction of such evidence altogether on due
process grounds.
10
In addition to motions spawned by the Commonwealth's use of
unadjudicated acts, motion practice with respect to the use of a defen-
dant's prior convictions can also be used to impose costs. For example,
the validity of convictions can be challenged11 and motions in limine can
be produced addressing the relevance, or lack of relevance, of the con-
victions to future dangerousness.
Finally, a motion can be filed to prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty on the basis that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to
establish future dangerousness.
This practice on the part of defense counsel will also set in motion,
with respect to each unadjudicated act, additional responsibilities of dis-
covery, litigation over potential Brady materials, evidentiary hearings,
experts, and investigators and will give defense counsel another opportu-
nity to generate relevant motions.
When imposing costs through the use of pretrial motions, the impor-
tance of filing motions to have the jury instructed accurately on the
defendant's parole eligibility, or lack thereof, if sentenced to life should
not be overlooked.
Virginia's mental health expert statute, Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1 (hereinafter "3:1") applies only to capital cases and, thus, is a cost
that can only be imposed when the Commonwealth seeks a death sen-
tence. Under this statute the defendant is entitled to psychiatric expert
assistance regarding issues of sanity and competency and in preparing a
case in mitigation, all at the Commonwealth's expense. The defendant
must only make the showing that (1) the defendant is indigent and (2) that
the defendant is charged with capital murder. This is not a difficult show-
ing for the defense to make, thus, this is an immediate and easily obtain-
able cost that can be imposed on the Commonwealth.
12
An additional requirement of 3:1 states that if the defendant intends
to introduce the mental health testimony obtained under 3:1, the
Commonwealth may require the defendant to submit to its own expert
evaluation. The forced submission of the defendant to the
Commonwealth's own experts is typically viewed as one of the disad-
vantages of obtaining a mental health expert under 3:1. However, as a
tool for imposing costs, this twist in the statute works to the defendant's
advantage. As in the portion of the statute pertaining to the defendant's
right to an expert, subsection F provides that the court shall order one or
more qualified experts to perform the evaluation. 13 Thus, the
9 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:2 (1993) (requiring that written notice
be given to the defendant of all prior unadjudicated act conduct which the
Commonwealth intends to introduce at sentencing).
10 See Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will Be Used
Against You in a Court of Law: The Use of Unadjudicated Acts in Capital
Sentencing, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993).
11 See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (holding that use
of invalid prior conviction as aggravating circumstance must result in
reversal of death sentence even where conviction not vacated until after
imposition of death sentence).
12 In addition, the language of the statute provides that the judge
"shall appoint one or more qualified mental health experts." As the spe-
cific language provides for the possibility of employing more than one
expert, defense counsel may be able to demonstrate to the
Commonwealth further additional costs by seeking a second or even third
expert. Additional experts are quite likely to be necessary, for example,
where there are indications that the defendant is mentally retarded. See
Simpson, Confessions and the Mentally Retarded Capital Defendant:
Cheating to Lose, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
13 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) (1990).
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Commonwealth's right to reciprocal expert examination is itself a cost to
the prosecutor. In addition, it may raise issues of defendant's right to
counsel at the examination, 14 of the use of defendant's statements when
not informed of his constitutional rights 15 and issues of preclusion under
3:1.16
Another possibility for imposing costs is the implementation of the
defendant's right to expert assistance as granted by Ake v. Oklahoma.
17
Ake also requires that the defendant be provided with funds for expert tes-
timony. The showing necessary to obtain experts under Ake is more dif-
ficult to meet than the showing required under 3:1. The appointment of
an expert for an indigent client is not automatic. Under Ake, the defense
must make the showing that the matter on which defendant needs expert
assistance is critically important to his defense. Thus, Ake provides
defense counsel with the "basic tools" necessary to ensure a proper
defense. However, this does not mean that the assistance granted must be
equal to the Commonwealth's resources.
Ake is not bound by the limitations presented by 3:1 which provides
only for mental health experts. Ake holds that the defendant is entitled to
any expert assistance necessary in preparing and presenting a defense.
Thus, although the showing under Ake is more difficult to meet, the
potential for imposition of costs on the Commonwealth is enormous and,
again, is a cost as a pretrial matter peculiar to capital cases. In addition,
counsel can demonstrate that the showing for procuring an expert under
Ake should be easier because the importance of confronting the
Commonwealth's forensic evidence is heightened in capital cases, as the
defendant's life is literally at stake. The showing should also be less rig-
orous to satisfy at the mitigation stage due to the broad scope of relevance
applicable to defense penalty trial evidence which, in turn, makes the
granting of a defense investigator even more crucial to the defendant's
case. Specifically with regard to Ake, if the prosecutor intends to intro-
duce a ballistics, blood, DNA or any other type of forensic expert,
defense counsel can demand experts of their own, all at the
Commonwealth's expense. Defense counsel may also be able to impose
costs by employing these experts, when appropriate, at both the
guilt/innocence trial and the penalty trial. In some instances, this serves
to double the cost imposed on the Commonwealth.
Imposing costs on the Commonwealth not only demonstrates to the
prosecutor that pursuing a death sentence may not be worthwhile but also
puts defense counsel in a better bargaining position as he communicates
to the prosecutor that the Commonwealth is battling a well-prepared
adversary.
B. The Soft Sell
The other approach that may be pursued, along with the imposition
of costs, is what might be termed the "soft sell." The soft sell serves to
give the Commonwealth a rational basis for moving the client's file out
of the "seek death" stack of his caseload. This section discusses how to
investigate, prepare and selectively reveal the case in mitigation in order
14 See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (holding that use,
in capital sentencing, of psychiatric evidence obtained in violation of
accused's Sixth Amendment right to have counsel receive advance notice
of examination held not harmless error under circumstances); Powell v.
Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989) (State's use of psychiatric testimony on issue
of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment where no notice
to defense counsel that examination by psychiatrist would be for that pur-
pose; defendant did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at
the examination by introducing psychiatric testimony in support of insan-
ity defense; error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
15 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 451 (1981) (holding that testimony
of psychiatrist based upon court-ordered psychiatric examination where
defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights violates the Fifth,
to allow the prosecutor to fairly conclude that seeking death for this
defendant is not all important, particularly in light of the costs being
imposed.
There are several means that may be employed to effectuate this
strategy. However, at the core of each of these theories is the develop-
ment of a strong theme of mitigation. Just as plea negotiations should
begin at the onset of the case, it is important to begin the mitigation inves-
tigation immediately upon accepting a capital case. 18 The information
gained from this investigation may serve to provide counsel with a foun-
dation for a successful negotiation theory.
One possible method for giving the Commonwealth a rational basis
for moving the client out of the capital murder category centers around
three primary ideas: the idea of "no-fault impairment"; the idea of
"shared responsibility"; and the idea of "struggle by the defendant."
These three theories should be used in conjunction with one another to
subtly reveal the case for mitigation and to provide the prosecutor with
rationally-based reasons to not seek a death sentence. It is important when
using these three theories to communicate to the prosecutor, as it is when
these theories are presented to a jury, that these mitigating factors are not
an excuse but a possible explanation for the defendant's actions.
The idea of "no-fault impairment" revolves around the premise that
at some point in the defendant's life an event, or series of events, took
place that impaired the defendant. These must be events that markedly
affected the defendant's life but cannot fairly be said to be completely the
defendant's own fault. Further, it is essential that the impairment bear a
relationship to the crime with which he is charged. Impairments not the
fault of the defendant that help to explain the crime are often not hard to
find.
For example, if the killing is drug related and if the defendant is a
drug abuser and counsel, during mitigation investigation, discovers that
his client's parents used drugs in the presence of the defendant from the
time he was a child or the parents actually forced the defendant himself
to use illegal drugs, counsel may be able to convince the Commonwealth
that the defendant wasn't entirely to blame .for his actions. Or, if the
defendant was sexually molested by his priest as a child and is on trial for
killing his homosexual lover 19 the prosecutor may accept the connection
between the childhood event and the crime as a basis for, at a minimum,
not seeking execution of the defendant. Further, if the client suffers from
organic brain damage or mental retardation and the crime the client is on
trial for can be linked to this mental disorder, this may be a factor the
Commonwealth can use to justify a sentence less than death.
The second alternative centers around the idea of "shared responsi-
bility." This involves examining the social surroundings of the defendant
(both past and present), the economic factors, the education of the defen-
dant and any discrimination to which the defendant may have been sub-
jected. Revelation of socio-economic factors affecting the life of the
defendant may provide an explanation for the Commonwealth to use in
agreeing to a non-capital disposition. When collecting evidence and pre-
senting the prosecutor with the idea of shared responsibility, it is impor-
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
16 See Bennett, Is Preclusion Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1
Unconstitutional?, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 24 (1989).
17 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
18 Attorneys actually defending a capital case may obtain Defending
A Capital Murder Case in Virginia, Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse,
pp. 1-14 (1993 Manual), for specific techniques on mitigation investiga-
tion. Mitigation investigation should involve a massive "paper trail" and
collection of information (schools, hospitals, court records, etc.). A thor-
ough investigation should also include interviews with all who have come
in contact with the defendant. For details, see above reference materials.
19 See Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276
(1990).
Page 38 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2
tant to emphasize that the shared responsibility is minimum shared
responsibility. It is not a claim that "it's all society's fault." Rather, it is
a claim that, because of the failures of others who had a responsibility
towards the defendant, he and he alone should pay for the crime, but by
life in prison, not by death. This involves finding people who, in fact, had
a responsibility to the defendant, such as social workers, medical actors,
school personnel or court officers. With this theory, defense counsel can
develop the idea that there were people in the defendant's life who had
official responsibilities with regard to the defendant's well-being but
they, in some way, failed him. And, this failure is relevant to the crime
with which the defendant is charged. For example, a medical actor left a
head injury untreated because the defendant could not afford medical
treatment and the defendant now suffers from some mental condition. Or,
a social worker failed to remove the defendant, when he was a child, from
his home where his parents were severely abusing him and he is now on
trial for sexually molesting and beating his own children to death. This
is where the idea of minimum responsibility plays a role. It is important
to relay to the Commonwealth that no other person, or persons, is solely
to blame or will in any way pay for the defendant's actions. But rather,
due to these failed responsibilities, the defendant is not deserving of
death.
The last of this trilogy of ideas involves the "struggle by the defen-
dant." This is the situation in which the defendant has struggled against
the impairment and tried to become "good," but has failed. Defense coun-
sel should investigate and attempt to find out the reasons for the defen-
dant's failure in his attempts to reform. As with the previous two theories,
counsel should try to tie in defendant's failure to the present actions.
For example, assume the defendant has suffered a troubled and abu-
sive childhood and that he has been in and out of juvenile correction pro-
grams. While in these structured institutions, the defendant was able to
adapt to society. However, either while in the institution or after the
defendant was released, certain events occurred (events that are fact spe-
cific to the individual case) and the defendant's assimilation was disrupt-
ed. For example, the defendant spent two years in a juvenile detention
center. Investigation reveals that the defendant adapted well to the insti-
tutionalized environment. However, when the defendant was released, he
returned home to live with his older brother who was still a substance
abuser. After a period of time, the older brother was able to coerce the
defendant into returning to his old habits. Again, this may provide the
Commonwealth with a rational basis for offering a sentence of less than
death. The prosecutor may see that the defendant has the capacity to
adapt to society in certain conditions and, thus, perhaps incarceration is
the just solution and death is unwarranted.
An alternative or addition to the three theories presented above, in
some cases, is one in which defense counsel may be able to emphasize the
defendant's positive attributes. Investigation may reveal exemplary qual-
ities of the defendant or may indicate that the defendant's actions were an
aberration in the defendant's life.
Further, when attempting to justify a non-capital disposition to the
Commonwealth, defense counsel should emphasize that a primary con-
cern involved in any criminal case is public safety, in other words, keep-
ing the defendant "off the streets." If the defendant accepts a plea agree-
ment, public safety concerns are satisfied by very lengthy, sometimes
permanent, incarceration Additionally, if a plea is agreed to, the defen-
dant waives the opportunity to appeal the conviction and, therefore, the
Commonwealth is able to avoid this lengthy and expensive process.
Counsel may also collect and refer to other cases whose facts appear more
aggravated than the facts in the case at hand, but were returned with a life
sentence. This is simply to say that a reasonable Commonwealth's attor-
ney, having seen a wider range of cases than jurors will have seen, may
be more receptive to a non-capital disposition.
20 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an
Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin Books 1991) [hereinafter
Finally, defense counsel should attempt to contact the victim's fam-
ily to determine their feelings regarding a capital sentence. These wit-
nesses are not the clients of the Commonwealth's attorney and no notice
to him is required. Discussions with the victim's family can prove
extremely beneficial to the defense. Besides, there is nothing to lose. If
the family is not supportive of a death sentence, this may also help to con-
vince the prosecutor to accept a plea agreement for a non-capital disposi-
tion. In addition, this can often be a service to the family as the prosecu-
tor may not have informed the family that in seeking a death sentence the
legal system will reopen the wounds every six to eight months as the case
progresses from pre-trial through years of appellate review. Because the
victim's family may be a genuine concern of the responsible prosecutor,
getting support from the family to not pursue a death sentence may prove
to be an invaluable bargaining tool for the defense.
HI. IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY
The pre-trial practice and collection of evidence described above is
essential to negotiation. Without it, there is no negotiation in any real
sense, because there is nothing on the table. Creating negotiating curren-
cy moves plea negotiation to something more than "plead" negotiations.
Once that is done, it helpful to have a framework for the actual discus-
sions.
If defense counsel chooses to employ the method of simultaneously
using a hard and soft sell approach, the following section discusses a spe-
cific tactic that can be implemented when actually dealing with the
Commonwealth. This strategy is based on a successful negotiation
method developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury as explained in their
book Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In.
20
There are two basic negotiating strategies that can be implemented
when negotiating for a non-capital disposition: (1) positional bargaining
and (2) principled bargaining.
When positional bargaining is used, negotiations are conducted in a
more competitive atmosphere. If defense counsel chooses to take a posi-
tional bargaining approach he must thoroughly analyze the case to deter-
mine its strengths and weaknesses. Counsel must develop a bottom line
or the weakest plea arrangement upon which he will still accept a bargain.
Counsel should attempt to conduct open discussions with the prosecutor
to extract as much information as possible about the Commonwealth's
case while giving up as little information as possible.
Positional bargaining requires that defense counsel decide what
result he ultimately wants to achieve, take a "position" more extreme than
his ultimate goal, and using various techniques, engage in a give-and-take
exchange with the adversary until some middle ground is reached. When
this type of negotiation is successful the "middle ground" and result
should be close to counsel's previously established goal.
However, this type of negotiation strategy is rarely successful.
Fisher and Ury explain that:
When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock
themselves into those positions. The more you clarify your
position and defend it against attack, the more committed you
become to it. The more you try to convince the other side of
the impossibility of changing your opening position, the more
difficult it becomes to do so.2 1
The authors further state that once this begins to happen a person's
ego becomes identified with the position. Needless to say, this is an espe-
cially big factor to avoid in a capital negotiation as it may become a life-
threatening situation. It may be life threatening for the defendant and it
may prevent the prosecutor from doing justice more economically and
"Getting to Yes"].
21 Id. at 4, 5.
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efficiently. Getting to Yes also reasons that when this type of situation
begins to occur and more attention is paid to positions, less attention is
devoted to meeting the underlying concerns of the parties and agreement
becomes less likely.
2 2
The second negotiating theory, and usually the more effective theo-
ry, is defined as "principled" negotiation. This method, as detailed in
Getting to Yes, encompasses four basic components: (1) separate the peo-
ple from the problem; (2) focus on interests, not positions; (3) invent
options for mutual gain; and (4) insist on using objective criteria.
The first step in principled bargaining is to separate the person the
negotiator is dealing with from the substantive goal he wants to achieve.
Getting to Yes explains that one of the major problems with positional
bargaining is that it puts relationship and substance in conflict. Framing
a negotiation as a contest of will over positions aggravates the entangling
process.2 3 This creates both an inefficient and unproductive negotiation.
To avoid this type of situation the authors suggest that the negotiator base
the relationship on accurate perceptions, clear communication, appropri-
ate emotions, and a forward-looking, positive outlook.
The relationship between the negotiators in a capital plea negotiation
is, by nature of the roles played by the defense attorney and the prosecu-
tor, inherently adversarial. Because, in effect, the two parties are often
negotiating whether or not a person will live or die, negotiations have the
tendency to quickly descend to a personal level. During the negotiation
process, defense counsel should be careful not to deal with the prosecu-
tor as someone who his out to kill his client, though it should be a guid-
ing assumption when actually imposing costs. If the prosecutor is met
with a sense of personal hostility on the part of defense counsel, he may
feel less inclined to work out an agreement. Whether right or wrong, from
the prosecutor's point of view, he is simply doing his job. If he feels he
is being personally attacked for what he believes he is paid to accomplish,
he may respond defensively and create a barrier to compromise. This
does not mean that counsel should avoid making any appeal to the pros-
ecutor's emotions. It simply means that the negotiations should center
around getting the client a non-capital sentence by communicating clear-
ly and focusing on the facts of the case versus attacking the prosecutor for
his position on the death penalty and his role as the "executioner."
The second step in principled bargaining is to focus on interests, not
positions. The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting posi-
tions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and
fears.24 Getting to Yes explains that "such desires and concerns are inter-
ests. Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hub-
bub of positions." 25 This is particularly true in capital negotiations where
each side is representing a vital interest: the defense attorney is repre-
senting his client's life while the prosecutor is representing the interests
of the community as a whole. Defense counsel should focus on under-
standing and recognizing what the Commonwealth's interests are. In par-
ticular, counsel should keep these interests in mind and genuinely seek to
accommodate them, without sacrificing the client's interests. Politically,
the prosecutor must look "tough." Still, defense counsel may be able to
convince the Commonwealth to agree to a first degree life sentence ver-
sus a capital life sentence. This could save the client ten years on his sen-
tence 26 and the prosecutor is still able to show the public a sentence that
is in fact severe, though not as severe as it appears.
Another interest of the Commonwealth may be to ensure that the
*defendant receives a sufficiently lengthy sentence. The prosecutor may be
22 Id. at5.
2 3 ld. at 20.
24 Id. at 40.
25 Id.
26 The possibility of reducing the defendant's sentence by agreeing
to plead guilty to a first degree life sentence versus a capital life sentence
results from the difference in parole eligibility for these two offenses
concerned that if the defendant is granted a non-capital sentence he may
be eligible for parole in too short a period of time. This concern, as will
be discussed in detail in the following section, can be remedied in an
appropriate case by fashioning a plea agreement that states that the defen-
dant will not seek parole. These types of agreements have been success-
fully negotiated in Virginia. Thus, when negotiating a plea, defense coun-
sel should be knowledgeable on the issues of parole so that he may make
the Commonwealth aware of precisely when the defendant will be parole
eligible.
Finally, defense counsel should keep the focus of the negotiations on
the prosecutor's primary concern: getting the defendant "off the streets."
As stated previously, defense counsel should remind the prosecutor that
if a plea agreement is reached, the Commonwealth's concern for public
safety will be satisfied as the defendant will be incarcerated. If an agree-
ment is reached between the two parties there is no chance that the defen-
dant will "walk." Thus, defense counsel should emphasize to the prose-
cutor that the Commonwealth's interests can lie met and a "win-win" sit-
uation for both sides can be accomplished without the imposition of a
sentence of death.
The third aspect of principled bargaining involves inventing options
for mutual gain. This aspect is closely related to the above phase of prin-
cipled bargaining that focuses on the parties' interests and concerns.
However, this step in principled bargaining involves the ability to sepa-
rate the process of thinking up possible alternatives from the process of
selecting among them.27 There are endless possibilities as to the finer
details of a plea agreement in a capital case. Fisher and Ury write that:
[flor a negotiator to reach an agreement that meets his own
self-interest he needs to develop a solution which also appeals
to the self-interest of the other. Yet emotional involvement on
one side of an issue makes it difficult to achieve the detach-
ment necessary to think up wise ways of meeting the interests
on both sides. There also frequently exists a psychological
reluctance to accord any legitimacy to the views of the other
side; it seems disloyal to think up ways to satisfy them.
Shortsighted self-concern thus leads a negotiator to develop
only partisan positions, partisan arguments and one-sided
solutions.
2 8
If defense counsel has made the decision that any agreement short of
a death sentence is to be considered a victory but is having difficulty in
getting the prosecutor to agree to any type of plea agreement, there is
nothing lost in attempting to set up a "brainstorming" session with the
Commonwealth. Remember that generating possible solutions does not
mean commitment to any possibility either side suggests.
If the Commonwealth agrees to participate in a "brainstorming" ses-
sion, defense counsel should establish a set of guidelines for the two sides
to follow. Getting to Yes suggests that the parties: (1) clearly define the
purpose of the session; (2) choose a time and place that distinguishes the
session as much as possible from regular negotiations; (3) design an
informal atmosphere; (4) employ a facilitator, if possible, to keep the
meeting on track; and (5) establish a "no-criticism" rule. The purpose of
the session is to generate ideas and possibilities, not to immediately com-
mit to any suggestion that is put on the table.2 9 An additional meeting
should be set up to attempt to implement any of the suggestions the two
parties come up with.
under Virginia's parole eligibility statute. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-15 1. For
a further discussion on parole eligibility considerations, see "The Legal
Framework in Virginia", section IV, infra.
27 See Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, supra note 20, at 60.
28 Id. at 59.
29 Id. at61.
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However, in order to protect the client's interests during the session,
distinguish the brainstorming session explicitly from a negotiating ses-
sion where official views are stated and are part of the record.
3 0
If counsel is able to convince the Commonwealth to participate in
this type of session it may prove to be invaluable to the client and a suc-
cessful plea agreement. This type of session affords counsel the oppor-
tunity to find out precisely what the Commonwealth's concerns are in the
case at hand and provides defense counsel with the opportunity to make
an attempt to meet the Commonwealth's needs and find common ground
on which to negotiate a non-capital disposition.
The final aspect to principled bargaining is to base the negotiations
on objective criteria. Getting to Yes explains that "the more you and the
other side refer to precedent and community practice, the greater your
chance of benefitting from past experience. An agreement consistent
with precedent is less vulnerable to attack."
3 1
In a capital negotiation, defense counsel should research other capi-
tal cases that have either reached a successful plea arrangement or were
returned with a life sentence at the penalty phase. By comparing the facts
of other cases that did not result in a sentence of death to the facts of the
case at hand, counsel may be able to convince the prosecutor that the case
being negotiated does not warrant a death sentence. Although there is no
concrete "objective" standard for evaluating a death-eligible case, a fact-
specific comparison may provide the prosecutor with a frame of reference
to use in justifying a non-capital disposition.
Agreeing upon a non-capital disposition should be easier under the
Getting to Yes method than other types of negotiation, either civil or crim-
inal. This is simply because negotiating a non-capital disposition really
is in both party's interest. It is not in the interests of the citizens of the
Commonwealth (who are the "clients" of the responsible prosecutor) to
spend hundreds of thousands of tax dollars in a process that might fail to
produce a death sentence or result in eventually having to repeat the entire
process over again. In addition, the result at best may bring about an exe-
cution five to ten years down the road, reopening the wounds for the vic-
tim's family every six to eight months only to come out with nothing that
has been demonstrated to be of any value to the citizens of the
Commonwealth.
30 Id. at 63.
31 Id. at 83. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse can assist
attorneys in providing this factual information as the Clearinghouse's
data bank contains examples of trial level dispositions that have not
shown up in appellate opinions.
32 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151 for procedures governing parole
eligibility.
33 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C) (1990).
34 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C) (1990).
35 The concurrence of the trial judge will not be a problem in the
vast majority of negotiated cases. If the trial judge will not commit to the
elimination of the penalty trial, it is possible that if the Commonwealth's
commitment not to offer any evidence at the penalty trial is strong
enough, defense counsel's motion to strike both aggravating factors
should be granted as a matter of law. See Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245
Va. 177, 427 S.E.2d 379 (1993). See also case summary of Beavers,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 26 (1993). In any event, an
important characteristic of this alternative is that it does not require waiv-
ing the jury trial. If this is successful and the jury sentences the defen-
dant to life, the judge will not be able to impose a sentence of death.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN VIRGINIA
There are many alternatives available to the defendant in terms of
what plea to accept and what sentence to offer and accept at the negotiat-
ing table. The following are a few of the options available in order of
desirability. The first alternative is a guilty plea to a lesser offense, such
as first degree murder. 32 This option can be done with or without an
agreement as to sentence and the defendant will not be eligible for parole
for fifteen years.
33
The second alternative available to the defendant during negotia-
tions is a trial on the capital murder charge without the possibility of
imposition of the death penalty. Here, the defendant is not pleading guilty
to any charges. The advantages to the Commonwealth with this option are
that it will save time, effort and money at the trial level and will remove
all issues at the appellate level that are peculiar to capital cases. In addi-
tion, this alternative guarantees that if the defendant is found guilty he
will not be parole eligible for at least twenty-five years.3 4 When seeking
to employ this alternative it is important to obtain a commitment from the
trial judge agreeing that there will not be a penalty trial.
35
The next alternative involves the defendant pleading guilty to non-
capital murder and a combination of predicate offenses. For example, the
defendant could agree to plead guilty to the non-capital murder (i.e. non-
class one felony) in addition to a combination of two offenses that carry
life sentences. In Virginia, first degree murder, rape and robbery all carry
a life sentence. Specifically, in Virginia, first degree murder is punish-
able as a class two felony36 the punishment for which is "imprisonment
for life or for any term not less than twenty years. ' 37 Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-61 states that a conviction for rape shall be punishable by "con-
finement ... for life or for any term not less than five years." Likewise,
a conviction for robbery is punishable by "life or any term not less than
five years." 38 Thus, the defendant pleading guilty to non-capital murder
in addition to a combination of two other life sentences will not be eligi-
ble for parole for twenty years.
39
The fourth alternative is to have the defendant agree to plead guilty
to capital murder with an agreement from the Commonwealth that it will
not seek the death penalty.40 This option may be easier to convince the
Commonwealth to approve than the agreement that allows the defendant
to simply plead guilty to a lesser offense. This is because with this option
the defendant will be admitting that he committed the crime of capital
murder. As a result, this type of agreement may be more acceptable to
the Commonwealth, as the defendant will not be eligible for parole for at
least twenty-five years.
4 1
Thus, it is important not to plead guilty without an agreement from the
trial judge, unless it is clear that the Commonwealth will present no evi-
dence of aggravating factors, and to avoid a bench trial without an agree-
ment from the judge not to impose a sentence of death.
36 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32 (1988).
37 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-10(b) (1988).
38 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-58 (1988).
39 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(D) (1990).
40 Again, although it may not be necessary to obtain a formal com-
mitment from the trial judge, the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in
Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636 (1993), reveals
the consequences of not receiving any assurance, formal or informal, that
the judge will not impose a sentence of death. For further discussion of
Dubois, see section VII, "Caveats of Negotiating a Capital Plea," infra.
Concurrence of the trial judge is the first option, with a firm agreement
by the prosecutor to put on no evidence of aggravating factors as a last
resort.
41 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C) (1990).
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Another possibility that can be agreed to involves parole eligibility
of no less than thirty years and does not require that the acts be part of the
same transaction. This thirty year parole eligibility combination can be
achieved by pleading guilty to capital murder and pleading guilty to an
additional life sentence offense.42 For example, the defendant may plead
guilty to capital murder in the commission of a robbery and be sentenced
to life and then enter an additional guilty plea to rape that also carries a
life sentence. This would guarantee that parole will not be granted for
thirty years and does not require that the offense be part of separate trans-
actions.
The final, and least desirable, alternative is to structure an agreement
that will result in no parole eligibility for a sentence of life imprisonment.
There are two options. One is a sworn, written pledge by the defendant
not to apply for parole. 43 Although it is possible for a prisoner to later lit-
igate the validity of parole eligibility, courts are not likely to be sympa-
thetic to a prisoner who later decides to challenge an agreement into
which he voluntarily entered. The second way in which this particular
outcome can be structured, in an appropriate case, is through mutual
agreement concerning the meaning of the Virginia "three-time loser"
statute. 44 This section states:
Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses
of (i) murder, (ii) rape, or (iii) robbery by the presenting of
firearms or other deadly weapon, or any combination of the
offenses specified in subdivisions (i), (ii) or (iii) when such
offenses were not part of a common act, transaction or scheme
shall not be eligible for parole.
45
As this statute establishes no eligibility for parole when a person has
been convicted of three separate felony offenses but requires that the
offenses not be a part of a common act, transaction or scheme, the parties
can include in the agreement a provision that the offenses to which the
defendant will plead guilty are agreed to be part of separate transactions.
This will ensure that the defendant will never be eligible for parole.
Sometimes, the facts of the case will make the "separate transaction"
issue a close one, so the agreement of all parties is important. Often, how-
ever, the parties will not have to "manipulate" the language of the statute
to create separate transactions, as separate transactions will often be a rea-
sonable interpretation of the events. For example, if defendant committed
murder of victim 1 at the victim's home, then proceeded to rape victim 2
and several hours later robbed a convenience store, it would be reason-
able to interpret the charges as separate transactions without any specific
agreement to a creative interpretation of the language of the statute and
offenses.
Garrett v. Commonwealth46 addressed the language of the "three-
time loser" statute with respect to its "common act, transaction or
scheme" requirement and held that it was for the parole board, and not the
court, to determine whether the convictions constituted a common
scheme for purposes of defendant's parole eligibility.4 7 However, the
parole board in Virginia has yet to exercise its power in this area and,
thus, should not impede any agreement reached between the defendant
and the Commonwealth.
Because with this plea arrangement the defendant will never be eli-
gible for parole, it is far less desirable than the other alternatives and
should only be pursued as a last resort.
'42 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(D) (1990).
43 This option has been successfully implemented in Virginia. The
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse can supply attorneys with details
and examples.
44 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B)(1) (1990).
V. NEGOTIATING WITH THE CLIENT
In addition to negotiating with the Commonwealth, defense counsel
must focus on his relationship with the client. It is often very difficult to
convince the client that it is in his best interest to accept a plea offer. It
is the defendant who may have to detail in open court the reasons that will
cause him to spend the rest of his life, or most of it, in prison. Postponing
the day of reckoning is human nature, as is an unrealistically optimistic
outlook on available defenses. Defense counsel must establish, by inno-
vation and work, a relationship that allows the defendant to feel confident
that counsel will fight for him and that the recommendations are in his
best interest. In rare cases (such as when a defendant is being held over
in a remote jurisdiction for another charge) it may be necessary to nego-
tiate the agreement first and then "sell" it to the client. However, it is
much more effective and desirable to involve the defendant at every
stage.
As stated above, the attorney must work at building a trust relation-
ship between himself and the client. It is important to communicate and
listen to the client. Many times there is a great sense of distrust on the
part of the client towards the defense attorney. The police, prosecutor and
judge are all part of a system that the client may believe is working
against him. The client often views defense counsel as merely another
actor in this system. Counsel should be conscious when he visits the
client not to simply tell him what he has to tell and engage in talking "at"
him. This requires the attorney to listen closely to what the client is
telling him and to understand the client's own concerns. This type of atti-
tude will help to foster a trust relationship between the attorney and his
client. Thus, if a plea agreement is offered, the attorney will be better
able to help the defendant make a decision that serves his best interests.
The attorney-client relationship, by its nature, must be professional.
However, counsel should keep in mind that the defendant may have lost
his friends and family and most likely feels alienated and alone. The
attorney must ensure that there is someone with whom the client is able
to speak comfortably. The case investigator, a clerk, or co-counsel are all
people who may be able to establish this type of personal relationship
with the client. Counsel may also want to consider having the client
speak with someone whom the client trusts will be frank and candid with
him about the possibilities with which he will be faced.
VI. KNOWING WHEN TO SAY " NO"
When defense counsel is preparing to negotiate with the
Commonwealth, he should engage in a thorough analysis of the case and
of the sentencing factors. There are numerous situations in which defense
counsel may find that it is in the best interests of the client to say "no" to
an offered plea agreement. Counsel might examine whether or not the
conduct the Commonwealth will be able to prove actually fits the capital
murder statute: whether the evidence, in fact, establishes one of the
threshold qualifiers. For example, when the Commonwealth seeks to
impose the death penalty under the multiple murder prong4 8 of the
Virginia capital murder statute and there is proof, or strong indications,
that the murders were not a part of the same transaction or there were less
than two premeditated murders, counsel should not readily accept a plea
agreement involving an admission of capital murder.
Counsel should also make a determination as to whether or not he
believes the Commonwealth will be able to prove the aggravating factors
necessary to support a death sentence, even after conviction of capital
45 Id.
46 14 Va. App. 154, 415 S.E.2d 245 (1992).
47 1d.
48 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7) (1988).
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murder. This requires a careful examination of the Commonwealth's
case at the penalty phase. For example, if the client has no prior record
it may be difficult for the Commonwealth to prove future dangerous-
ness.49 Or, if the capital offense involved only a single shot, the
Commonwealth may have difficulty in establishing vileness. 50 The facts
of a case involving a single shot will rarely be sufficient to satisfy the
vileness factor.
Another situation in which defense counsel should proceed cau-
tiously, when determining whether or not to enter into a plea agreement,
is one in which the defendant may be liable only as an accomplice.
Excluding murder-for-hire, the Virginia legislature has limited the death
eligible class of defendants to actual perpetrators. 5 1 Thus, in order to
convict a defendant of an offense greater than first degree murder, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the triggerman.52  If defense counsel believes that the
Commonwealth will be unable to meet this standard of proof, this may be
a situation in which defendant should not plead guilty to capital murder,
even with a life sentence agreement.
In addition, counsel should examine the strength of the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief. Defense counsel should consider sup-
pression potential, whether or not there is a confession by the defendant,
the reliability of any snitch testimony being offered by the
Commonwealth, 53 the quality of the Commonwealth's witnesses and
how likely it will be for the Commonwealth to prove the predicate felony.
If there is great potential for suppression of evidence or genuine concerns
as to the reliability of the Commonwealth's witnesses, informants or oth-
erwise, defense counsel should give careful consideration before saying
yes to any agreement that is offered.
Further, defense counsel should examine his own case in mitigation.
If there is an overwhelming case for mitigation making the possibility of
the jury returning a life sentence highly probable, that is a factor coun-
seling in favor of rejecting some proposals.
Finally, when defense counsel's client is a juvenile he should thor-
oughly explore the possibility that his client may not be eligible for cap-
ital murder due to the client's age.
54
These are all factors that defense counsel should consider when
deciding whether or not to accept a plea offer from the prosecutor.
Knowing when to say "no" is an important aspect of a successful non-
capital negotiation.
49 Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C), the Commonwealth is
required to prove future dangerousness by establishing that the defendant
"would constitute a continuing serious threat to society .... "
50 In order to prove vileness, the Commonwealth must establish that
the defendant's "conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4(C) (1990).
51 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(2) (1988).
52 Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990).
The court in Cheng held that there was insufficient evidence that Cheng
was in fact the triggerman. Because the evidence was insufficient to
maintain a capital conviction, the court reversed the judgement and the
death sentence, remanding the case for a new trial on a charge no greater
than first degree murder. The court specifically noted that, while the con-
fession and the circumstantial evidence permitted an inference that Cheng
was the triggerman, a mere probability or suspicion of guilt, no matter
how strong, was insufficient to convict Cheng of capital murder. See case
summary of Cheng, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 20 (1990).
VII. CAVEATS OF NEGOTIATING A CAPITAL PLEA
As in any case, civil or criminal, negotiating a settlement means
some benefit to each party. There is no benefit to pleading guilty to cap-
ital murder before a judge who will not give a formal or very strong
informal assurance that the sentence will not be death.
Thus, one consideration in proceeding with a plea agreement is
determining how firm must be the commitment to not seek a death sen-
tence when the plea bargain requires the defendant to plead guilty to cap-
ital murder. The best position for the defense is to procure an agreement
signed by all parties involved, including the prosecutor and the presiding
judge. The defendant should not plead guilty to capital murder without a
strong official or unofficial commitment from the judge. The conse-
quences of not obtaining this type of assurance can be seen by examining
the tragic outcome of Dubois v. Commonwealth.55 In Dubois, the defen-
dant pled guilty to five charges, including capital murder, pursuant to an
agreement with the Commonwealth that it would not seek the death
penalty. The Commonwealth presented its evidence against Dubois and
Dubois reaffirmed his plea. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant stat-
ed that he had read the pre-sentence report, understood the consequences,
and maintained his plea of guilty to capital murder and four other charges.
The defendant neither questioned the author of the pre-sentence report
nor presented any evidence in mitigation. Subsequently, defense counsel
stated that the record did not support imposition of the death penalty, and
the Commonwealth informed the court that it was not seeking the death
penalty.
Disregarding the agreement between the Commonwealth and the
defendant, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death based on a
finding of future dangerousness. Dubois appealed and challenged the
trial court's imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld the conviction and sentence and held that although the
trial court "was obliged to consider" the Commonwealth's agreement not
to seek the death penalty as a factor in its decision, the court was not
bound to accept its recommendation.
5 6
As evidenced by the outcome of Dubois, having no indication as to
what sentence the trial judge will impose can have devastating conse-
quences. However, it may not always be necessary, when seeking a non-
capital disposition, to obtain official assurances from the trial judge. In
rare cases, if there are strong unofficial indications from the judge that he
will not impose a sentence of death, it may be safe to proceed with the
guilty plea.
See also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 410 S.E.2d 621 (1991)
(reversed conviction where defendant admitted rape but denied killing;
there was a possibility, but no direct evidence that there was an accom-
plice). See case summary of Rogers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No.
2, p. 7 (1992).
53 See Miles, Subtle Influences: The Constitutionality of Jailhouse
Informant Testimony in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5,
No. 1, p. 51 (1992), for an insightful discussion on the different types of
challenges and constitutional arguments available against the use of such
testimony at the pretrial, guilt and sentencing stages of capital murder tri-
als.
54 See VanBuskirk and Clunis, Applying the Virginia Capital Statute
to Juveniles, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 42 (1993), for a
thorough discussion on when the Virginia statute may be applied to juve-
niles.
55 246 Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636 (1993). See case summary of
Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 28 (1993).
56 Dubois, 246 Va. at 265, 435 S.E.2d at 639.
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2 - Page 43
This step should not be taken, however, without recognition that the
consequences of pleading guilty to capital murder with no plea agreement
can be devastating to the defendant. In Savino v. Commonwealth,5 7 the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that because the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily pled guilty to the charges and waived his right to a trial
on these charges, he was found to have waived all defenses except ajuris-
dictional challenge. Further, in Stout v. Commonwealth,5 8 the defendant,
Larry Allen Stout, pled guilty to both the capital murder and robbery
charge. Subsequently, the court rejected the majority of the defendant's
assignments of error. Citing Beaver v. Commonwealth,5 9 the court held
that because Stout knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty, such assign-
ments were not cognizable.
As evidenced by the preceding case law, counsel should be extreme-
ly cautious in allowing a defendant to plead guilty to capital murder with
no plea agreement. Without a formal trial, the majority of issues that
could have been raised on appeal will not be available or will be default-
ed. When this occurs there is little recourse for the defendant and the
damage resulting from a bargainless guilty plea stands little or no chance
of being remedied.
Although not discussed in Dubois, the issue of adequate notice may
and should be raised at the last moment if no mitigation evidence has
been offered in reliance on an agreement and it appears that the judge will
disregard the agreement and sentence the defendant to death. Defense
counsel may be able to rely on Lankford v. Idaho60 for relief. Lankford
held that "[pletitioner's lack of adequate notice that the judge was con-
templating the imposition of the death sentence created an impermissible
risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned in the case. ' 6 1 In
Lankford, a silent judge listened to arguments about sentencing length
57 239 Va. 534, 538,391 S.E.2d 276,279 (1990). See case summa-
ry of Savino, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 15 (1990).
58 237 Va. 288, 376 S.E.2d 288 (1989). See case summary of Stout,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 4 (1989).
and never indicated that the real issue was whether or not to impose a
death sentence. Thus, the court further held that the defendant and his
counsel did not have adequate notice that the judge might impose a death
sentence; therefore, the sentencing process violated Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirements. 62
Thus, upon first learning that expectations are not going to be met,
counsel may be in a position to argue on the record lack of notice and a
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation under Lankford in order to,
at a minimum, establish a foundation for appellate review. Obviously,
every effort should be made to avoid this situation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The most important goal from defense counsel's perspective in the
run of capital murder cases is to ensure that the defendant does not
receive a death sentence. The most effective way to accomplish this goal
is simply to remove that option from possible outcomes. Thus, the nego-
tiation process is of vital importance and must be afforded serious efforts.
Juries may be less likely to return a life sentence in part because, unlike
the prosecutor, they have not been exposed to the range of circumstances
under which homicides are committed. As a result, negotiating a plea
with a responsible prosecutor is often defense counsel's best opportunity
to guarantee a non-capital disposition of the case. Negotiating without
the currency generated by imposing costs on the Commonwealth and pre-
senting mitigation without thorough knowledge of both the law of capital
murder and the law of sentencing, and without creativity and good client
relations, will usually result in the loss of a life-saving opportunity.
59 232 Va. 521, 526-27, 352 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1987).
60 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991). See case summary of Lankford, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 9 (1991).
61 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1733.
62 1d. at 1731.
